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
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FOR ARA/ASST, SECY, BOWDLER FROM CHAPLIN  
E.O. 120651 GDS 1/8/86 (CHAPLIN, MAXWELL) DR-M  
TAGS: PORC SHUM AR  
SUBJ: HUMAN RIGHTS -- OPPORTUNITY TO NEGOTIATE

1. C -- ENTIRE TEXT.  
2. THE GOA'S BEHAVIOR ON THE CUBAN UNSC SEAT AND ON CONDEMNATION OF THE USSR ON AFGHANISTAN SHOWS THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO GO TO ALMOST ANY LENGTHS TO ESCAPE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THE PROSPECT OF CONDEMNATION BY THE UNCHR IN FEBRUARY HAS CONCENTRATED THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTENTION ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM TO A DEGREE I HAVE NOT SEEN IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS. CHANCES ARE GOOD THAT WE COULD NEGOTIATE SOME SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR US VOTE IN GENEVA TO KEEP THE ARGENTINE CASE UNDER REVIEW RATHER THAN A VOTE TO CONDEMN.  
3. THE GOA HAS SHOWN GREATER ANXIETY ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING UNCHR MEETING AND THE IAHRC REPORT THAN OVER ANY OTHER FOREIGN RELATIONS ISSUE BESIDES THE BEAGLE CHANNEL. THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TO THE UN, THE OAS, AND THE EUROPEAN AMBASSADORS HAVE BEEN RECALLED FOR DRAFTING AND STRATEGY SESSIONS. WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING OTHER INDICATIONS OF EXTREME GOA SENSITIVITY TO THE PROSPECT OF INTERNATIONAL CENSURE, BUT IT WAS ONLY YESTERDAY WHEN ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER CURA DESCRIBED THE MATTER AS ONE OF VITAL CONCERN TO THE GOA THAT A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL ADMITTED THE DEPTH OF THEIR CONCERN. AS THINGS STAND, ALL OF THE GOA'S ENERGY IS DIRECTED AT DEALING WITH THE TACTICS OF AVOIDING CENSURE AND LITTLE TOWARD REMEDYING THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES THEMSELVES. THIS IS NOT PRODUCTIVE FOR OUR OBJECTIVES. CURA SAID THE BEST THE GOA COULD EXPECT FROM GENEVA WAS A RESOLUTION BY WHICH THE COMMISSION MAINTAINED THE ARGENTINE SITUATION UNDER REVIEW, AND HE IMPLIED THEY WOULD DO ALMOST ANYTHING TO ACHIEVE SUCH A RESULT. THE GOA APPARENTLY SEES



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THE UNCHR VOTE AS A PATTERN FOR JAS ACTION ON THE IAHCR REPORT. WE ARE AT A POINT OF MAXIMUM INFLUENCE OVER THE GOA. WE CAN VOTE TO CONDEMN THEM AND EXHAUST ANY INFLUENCE, OR VOTE TO WATCH THEM AND PRESERVE INFLUENCE. 4. THIS SITUATION SEEMS TAILOR-MADE FOR NEGOTIATION. IF WE ARE IN A POSITION TO VOTE (AND URGE OTHERS TO DO THE SAME) FOR THE Milder RESOLUTION, WE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO GET SOME SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS FROM THE GOA ON MATTERS SUCH AS PAROLE OR RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, IMPROVEMENT IN PRISON STANDARDS, AND MAKE A CAUTIOUS BEGINNING IN THE PROBLEM OF THE DISAPPEARED. SINCE THE GOA CONSIDERS THE LATTER PROBLEM INSOLUBLE, IT WOULD NOT BE GOOD TACTICS TO PUT IT UP FRONT IN A NEGOTIATION. IF YOU WOULD AUTHORIZE ME TO EXPLORE THIS POSSIBILITY, I WOULD SPEAK WITH COL. CERDA OF THE PRESIDENCY, WHO SORTED OUT THE PROBLEMS WITH INVITING THE IAHRC. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT THIS CAN BE AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH WE SHOULD NOT LET GET AWAY. CHAPLIN

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